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1 Introduction 
 
This paper provides a summary, overview and synthesis of the findings of the second phase 
of the AFD/Maastricht Graduate School of Governance research project on institutions and 
economic growth. The point of departure for this research project is that the diversity of long-
run patterns of economic growth and development can only be fully understood if one 
incorporates institutions, institutional diversity and institutional change into the analysis of 
economic development.1  
Following Douglass North, institutions are defined as “the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In 
consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or 
economic.” (North, 1990). Gehlen (1958) defines institutions as a “regulatory agency, 
channelling human actions in much the same way as instincts channel animal behaviour”. 
This second definition is consistent with that of North, but emphasises the differences 
between human societies governed by institutions and animal behaviour regulated by 
instincts. Institutions are not just any rules that shape human interactions; they refer to 
complexes of rules regulating the central problems of social life such as control of violence, 
family relationships, and economic production. These rules are deeply embedded in human 
consciousness through education and socialisation and are transferred from generation to 
generation. 
It is important to make a clear distinction between institutions (the rules) and organisations 
(actors influenced by rules and incentives). One should also distinguish between institutions, 
which regulate specific spheres of human interaction and the more general concept of culture 
which captures a broader set of values, norms and cognitions that characterise societies. 
Institutions are supported by culture, but are oriented to specific spheres of interaction. 
Cultural elements can buttress institutions, but are not identical to them. 
Next, we are not just interested in institutions per se but specifically in the kind of institutions 
that promote growth and poverty reduction: the humanly devised constraints that provide 
positive incentives for actors to engage in capital accumulation, educational investment, 
invention, innovation and incentives to provide and maintain social stability. 
The AFD/MGSoG research programme on institutions and growth has a number of related 
aims: 
- Contribute to a better theoretical and empirical understanding of the institutional sources 
of growth and development 
- Contribute to a better theoretical and empirical understanding of the institutional sources 
of variations in growth performance 
- Contribute to better empirical measurement of institutions, using data from the 
Institutional Profiles Database and other institutional databases 
                                               
1 I thank Richard Bluhm, Luciana Cingolani, Denis de Crombrugghe and Nicolas Meisel for valuable comments 
and criticisms. 
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- Explore methodological issues in quantitative research on the relationships between 
institutions and economic development 
- Explore the possible uses of the institutional profiles database (IPD) developed by AFD in 
research, thereby contributing to the international visibility of the IPD database. 
- Exploring the policy implications of the role of institutions in economic development 
Work on the research programme commenced in May 2009. After a preliminary phase lasting 
from May 2009 till November 2010, the first phase of the research programme started on 20 
November 2010 and ended on 31 December 2011. The second phase of the project was 
executed between June 2012 and 31 May 2013. The project was funded by AFD.  
During a preliminary phase of the programme (May 2009 - November 2009) a new wave of 
institutional data was collected for the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD). During the 
second phase of the programme, data were collected for the 2012 wave of the IPD. Over time 
the Maastricht research team has contributed to the further refinement of the questionnaire 
and to methodological discussions with regard to the process of data cleaning, coding, 
aggregation and the organisation of the database. The 2009 and 2012 data are now available 
online, along with results of earlier waves in 2001 and 2006. The data can be accessed via the 
website of the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance: http://mgsog.merit.unu.edu/ 
research/IPD/data.php and the website of AFD and CEPII: http://www.cepii.fr/IPD.asp 
  
During phase one of the project the following working papers were produced, all of which 
have been posted on the UNU-MERIT/MGSOG website: www.merit.unu.edu/research/ipd/ 
publications) and/or mgsog.merit.unu.edu/research/IPD/publications.php: 
- Adam Szirmai, Proximate, Intermediate and Ultimate Causality: Theories and 
Experiences of Growth and Development, UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series 2012-
32/Working Paper Series on Institutions and Economic Growth, IPD- WP01. 
- Richard Bluhm and Adam Szirmai, Institutions and Long-run Growth Performance. An 
Analytic Literature Review of the Institutional Determinants of Economic Growth, UNU-
MERIT Working Paper Series 2012-33/Working Paper Series on Institutions and 
Economic Growth, IPD- WP02. 
- Luciana Cingolani and Denis de Crombrugghe, Techniques for Dealing with Reverse 
Causality between Institutions and Growth, UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series 2012-
34/Working Paper Series on Institutions and Economic Growth, IPD- WP03. 
- Kristine Farla and Denis de Crombrugghe, Preliminary Conclusions on Institutions and 
Institutional Performance, UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series 2012-35/Working Paper 
Series on Institutions and Economic Growth, IPD- WP04. 
- Bart Verspagen, Stylised Facts of Governance, Institutions and Economic Development. 
Exploring the Institutional Profiles Database, UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series 2012-
36/Working Paper Series on Institutions and Economic Growth, IPD- WP05. 
- Luciana Cingolani and Denis de Crombrugghe, Exploring the Panel Components of IPD, 
UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series 2012-37/Working Paper Series on Institutions and 
Economic Growth, IPD- WP06. 
- Kristine Farla, Institutions and Credit, UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series 2012-
38/Working Paper Series on Institutions and Economic Growth, IPD- WP07. 
- Kristine Farla, Industrial Policy for Growth, UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series 2012-
39/Working Paper Series on Institutions and Economic Growth, IPD- WP08. 
- Richard Bluhm, Denis de Crombrugghe and Adam Szirmai, Explaining the Dynamics of 
Stagnation. An Empirical Examination of the North, Wallis and Weingast Approach, 
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UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series 2012-40/Working Paper Series on Institutions and 
Economic Growth, IPD- WP09. 
- Biniam Bedasso, Lords of Uhuru: The Political Economy of Elite Competition and 
Institutional Change in Post-Independence Kenya, UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series 
2012-41/Working Paper Series on Institutions and Economic Growth, IPD- WP010. 
The findings and insights of the papers of the first phase were summarised in A. Szirmai and 
B. Verspagen, Institutions and Economic Growth. Summary and Synthesis, January 2012.  
During the second phase of the project the following seven working papers were written, all 
of have been been posted on the UNU-MERIT/MGSoG website: 
- Richard Bluhm, Denis de Crombrugghe and Adam Szirmai, Do Weak Institutions Prolong 
Crises? On the identification, characteristics and duration of Declines during Economic 
Slumps. 
- Richard Bluhm, Denis de Crombrugghe and Adam Szirmai, The Pace of Poverty 
Reduction Revised. A fractional Response Approach. 
- Samyukta Bhupatiraju and Bart Verspagen, Economic Development, Growth, Institutions 
and Geography. 
- Luciana Cingolani, The State of State Capacities: A Systematic Overview of Perspectives 
and Evidence on Determinants and Consequences 
- Luciana Cingolani, Kaj Thomsson, Denis de Crombrugghe, State Capacity, Bureaucratic 
Autonomy and Millennium Development Goals 
- Kristine Farla, Denis de Crombrugghe and Bart Verspagen, Institutions, Foreign Direct 
Investment and Domestic Investment: Crowding Out or Crowding in? 
- Kristine Farla, Determinants of Firms’ Investment Behaviour: A Multilevel Approach 
As spin-offs of the institutions project we can also mention the completion of two PhD 
theses: 
Biniam Bedasso, Institutional Change in the Long Shadow of Elites; Essays on Institutions, 
Human Capital and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, defended 10 October 2013 
Kristine Farla, Macro-Economic Studies on Institutions, Policy and Economic Development, 
approved, October 2013, defended 2013. 
 
Research during the second phase of the project builds upon the experiences of the first phase 
and selects certain themes for further elaboration. Thus in the first phase Richard Bluhm, 
Denis de Crombrugghe and Adam Szirmai argued that in order to understand the long-term 
process of economic growth, this should be broken down into different growth episodes such 
as slumps, recoveries or growth accelerations. Their paper - Explaining the Dynamics of 
Stagnation - focused on the determinants of the onset of economic slumps. Their new paper 
continues the analysis of growth episodes, examining the duration of economic declines. The 
two papers by Kristine Farla in the first phase analysed institutional determinants of 
proximate factors that affect growth performance, namely industrial policies and financial 
credit. Two new papers expand on the examination of the determinants of proximate sources 
of growth, now zooming in on the crucial role of foreign and domestic investment and their 
determinants. Using data from the 2009 IPD survey, Samyukta Bhupatiraju and Bart 
Verspagen test key hypotheses derived from the institutionalist literature regarding the 
relative importance of geography, institutional characteristics and economic openness. Two 
papers by Luciana Cingolani and her co-authors select one institutional sphere as an 
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important subject for in-depth empirical and theoretical analysis, namely state capacities. 
Finally Richard Bluhm, Denis de Crombrugghe and Adam Szirmai focus on one of the very 
important institutional spheres, namely that of inequality. Using new econometric 
approaches, they examine the potential contributions of growth and inequality to poverty 
reduction.  
One of the original goals for the second phase of the institutions project was to explore the 
panel characteristics of the successive waves of the IPD survey. Unfortunately the data for 
the 2012 IPD came available too late to be included in the analysis. Creating a panel version 
of the IPD remains one of the interesting challenges for future research. It would allow 
researchers to shift from cross-section analyses of institutions to a more dynamic approach, 
allowing for analysis of institutional change over time. 
In the following sections the findings of the seven papers of phase two of the project will be 
summarised and synthesised in a non-technical fashion. For the technical details the reader is 
referred to the original papers. 
2 Institutions and the duration of slumps 
 
One of the stylised facts emerging from the research on institutions and long-run economic 
growth is that there is a strong correlation between institutional characteristics and levels of 
GDP per capita. Thus, formalisation of rules, well-defined property rights, and constraints on 
the power of the executive seem to be associated with higher levels of GDP per capita. 
However, there is a remarkable absence of any correlation between institutional 
characteristics and growth rates of GDP per capita in the short run. On first sight, this is 
somewhat paradoxical. If differences in levels of per capita are associated with differences in 
institutional characteristics, then logically there should be a correlation between long-run 
growth rates and institutional characteristics.2  
One reason for this continuing paradox is methodological: there is a paucity of time series on 
institutions, which go back far enough for the purposes of analysis of long-run trends. 
However, there is also a substantive reason. As several authors have shown (e.g. Hausmann, 
Pritchett and Rodrik, 2005), there is no reason why developing countries with poor 
institutions cannot grow rapidly. Growth spurts can be found across all levels of 
development. What we learn from the work of authors such as North, Wallis and Weingast 
(2009), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002), or Hausmann et al. (2005) is that the 
key question is not whether growth can be started, but whether it can be sustained over longer 
periods. The argument is that countries with weaker institutions (e.g. ‘limited access orders’ 
or ‘extractive institutions’) find it harder to sustain growth and are more vulnerable to 
experiencing sustained periods of crisis and stagnation. In other words, rather than focusing 
only on average growth rates, one should analyse the characteristics of different types of 
growth episodes. 
                                               
2 Assuming that in the very long run all countries started from similar (subsistence) levels of per capita income. 
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In the paper Do Weak Institutions Prolong Crises? On the identification, characteristics and 
duration of Declines During Economic Slumps (Bluhm, de Crombrugghe and Szirmai) the 
key variable of interest is the length of declines in a crisis. Here we provide a non-technical 
summary of some of the key findings. 
Identifying slumps 
The first part of the paper develops an econometric methodology to identify slumps. Slumps 
are defined according to three criteria: 1. A slump is a departure from a previously positive 
trend; 2. A slump must begin with negative growth in the first year; 3. A slump is a 
pronounced regime switch, not just a minor business cycle fluctuation. To capture these 
requirements, a two-break structural equation is specified, which splits time series into three 
different growth regimes: (1) a pre-slump regime from the beginning of the time series of a 
country till , (2) a slump/recovery regime lasting from year   1 to year , and (3) a 
post slump regime from year   1 onwards. The two break dates are endogenously 
determined. If the breakpoints meet tests of statistical significance, we have identified a 
slump. The procedure is repeated for the pre-slump and post slump periods to test whether 
there is more than one slump in a country during the period of analysis from 1950 to 2008. 
The end of the slump is defined as the year in which GDP per capita first reaches or exceeds 
the pre-slump peak. 
Once a slump has been identified, it is decomposed into two phases as follows. The decline 
phase is the period from the onset of the slump till the lowest level of GDP per capita (the 
“trough”) before the end of the slump or, if the pre-slump peak is not reached, before the end 
of the sample period. The recovery phase is the period between the trough and the year GDP 
per capita reaches its pre-slump peak again. In this fashion in total 58 slumps are identified 
for 52 countries between 1950 and 1998. These 58 slumps are our units of analysis. 
Figure 1 illustrates some of the diversity of slumps identified by this method. Panel (a) shows 
a finished slump in Mexico where the trend growth rate is nearly unchanged after the slump. 
Panel (b) shows a finished slump in Switzerland where the trend growth rate decelerated after 
the slump. Panel (c) shows a finished slump in Albania occurring at the time of the post-
communist transition with an accelerated post-slump trend. Last but not least, panel (d) 
shows an unfinished slump with two negative trend breaks in Togo. In the case of unfinished 
slumps, the paper takes the duration between the beginning of the decline and the lowest 
point of the unfinished decline as the duration. 
Subsequently the analysis proceeds in two directions: (1) describing the behaviour of 
economic and institutional variables in the run up to the slump and after the onset of the 
slump. (2) identifying the variables that influence the duration of a slump, using survival 
models. 
 
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 2 provides examples of the first type of analysis (correlates of slumps). In the figure 
we compare the degree to which a given variable deviates from its normal values (in non
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-
crisis times) per country, in the five years prior to the start of a slum
five years after the onset of the slump. Years are found on the horizontal axis. Year zero is 
the last year of the pre-slump growth regime (i.e. the year 
the example of inflation, we see that in the five years before a slump inflation rates tend to be 
slightly elevated compared to an average year outside the 11
but given the confidence intervals they do not deviate sign
In the five years after the onset of the slump, inflation rates increase and deviate significantly 
from their normal values. Figure 2 also documents the movements of three other economic 
variables: real exchange rate und
(obviously a collapse after the downbreak) and output gap relative to potential (decline after 
the downbreak). This kind of analysis is repeated for in total 21 economic variables and eight 
institutional variables. 
Figure 3: Institutional Correlates of Slumps
From the perspective of this summary the most important findings refer to some of the 
institutional variables. Examples are provided in figure 3. Using polity scores, the authors 
find that the polity score is much lower than in normal times in the run up to a slump, 
suggesting that worse institutions may contribute to macro
slump the average polity scores clearly shift upwards, indicating that slumps provide 
possibilities for institutional improvement or reform. All the sub
combined polity score, including constraints on the executive, show very similar trends.
Next, the paper finds that there is little evidence that negative regime changes prec
downbreaks, or occur with heightened probability thereafter. This is interesting as one might 
expect that negative regime changes are themselves a source of economic instability. What is 
particularly interesting however is a marked upward trend in the 
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regime changes from the eve of a slump onwards. Although these findings do not constitute 
causal relationships, slumps seem to provide incentives for positive regime change.  
It is often argued that political turmoil, conflict and war contribute to economic instability. 
This is not reflected by the data in this paper. There is no evidence that there is significantly 
more war, conflict or irregular leader exit than normal in the five years in the run up to a 
crisis. This is consistent with the findings on negative regime changes.  
Bluhm et al. (2013, p. 20) summarise the findings as follows: "Many indicators and economic 
aggregates evolve in the expected manner but often represent a mix of endogenous policy 
responses. For example, higher inflation, a depreciating real exchange rate and a re-balancing 
of the current account are both testament of the strong price pressures faced by these 
economies but also of the necessary adjustments that ultimately help to stabilize the 
downturn. Other covariates behave in interesting ways around the break date. The difference 
between de facto trade flows and de jure openness is striking and suggests that trade 
restrictions play an important role for the occurrence of slumps. Additionally, several 
indicators of exports, financial development and financial integration either switch means 
around the time the slump hits or remain permanently below the levels of normal times 
throughout. While this exercise could certainly be extended further with more policy 
variables, the most interesting and unexpected finding is a switch from significantly lower 
quality institutions in the run up to a slump back to better scores occurring in the first two 
years after the downbreak. This indicates that weaker institutions precede the beginning of a 
slump, while the slump itself offers a window of opportunity for institutional improvements, 
and thus illustrates the endogenous nature of institutions.” The relationship between 
economic shocks and subsequent institutional change is an interesting avenue for future 
research. In particular, the hypothesis of institutional improvement in response to economic 
shocks deserves further attention.  
Understanding the duration of declines 
With regard to variables influencing the duration of declines a large number of variables are 
considered. Given the rather limited number of observations – 58 decline spells between 1950 
and 2008 – there are limits to how many variables can be entered into a regression 
simultaneously. The paper tackles this problem by defining a base specification with the log 
of duration of the slump as the dependent variable. The base specification includes two 
measures of institutions as explanatory variables, namely constraints on executive power and 
degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. The base specification also includes the real US 
interest rate as a typical exogenous economic variable and initial GDP per capita (initial 
referring to year zero, the year before the onset of a slump). Subsequently a whole range of 
other variables (that passed a variable selection step) are entered into the regressions, in order 
to see if any of these potentially ‘omitted variables’ change the estimated relationship 
between institutions, ethnic heterogeneity and the duration of declines.  
Constraints on the executive are the preferred proxy of institutional quality for two reasons. 
First, it is widely used in the empirical literature as a measure of institutional constraints 
placed on political actors and has already been linked to macroeconomic volatility (e.g. 
Acemoglu et al., 2003; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Second, it is more conceptually rooted 
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in the economic theory of institutions than any of the broader measures capturing wider 
aspects of the political regime (e.g. democracy or autocracy). For ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation, the paper uses two measures from Desmet et al. (2012), who recently 
developed a very detailed set of estimates of ethnic cleavages. They compute the probability 
that two randomly chosen individuals belong to different groups at different levels of ‘the 
language tree’. ELF1 is the most aggregate variable, capturing only crude distinctions such as 
Indo-European versus non-Indo European languages, and ELF15 represents the most 
disaggregate level, differentiating among the language groups known today. The paper uses 
the latter indicator – ELF15 – as its primary measure.3   
Other variables entered into the regressions include: inflation, de jure trade openness, de facto 
trade openness, export diversification, export sophistication, the ratio of private credit to 
GDP, financial depth, the Gini of the income distribution, infant mortality, life expectancy 
and schooling. 
Two very robust results emerge with regard to the institutional variables. First, constraints on 
executive power always have a significant negative coefficient. In other words, in societies 
where the power of the executive is constrained through checks and balances declines are 
shorter than in societies where such checks and balances are weaker. Conditional on having 
entered a slump, a country with the lowest score on the executive constraints measure is 
expected to decline for about 9.1 years, while a country with the highest score is expected to 
decline only for about 3.1 years. The second finding is that, the higher the degree of ethnic 
fractionalisation, the longer declines will last. 
The paper goes on to analyse the interactions between constraints on the executive and ethnic 
fractionalisation. The reasoning is as follows. Given a political economy in which (latent) 
social conflict, as measured by ethnic fractionalisation, challenges the ability of political 
actors to take coordinated action to resolve an economic crisis, better institutions - property 
rights, constraints on the executive - may help overcome this negative effect. Countries with 
very high fractionalisation may require particularly strong institutions to compensate for the 
negative effect of fractionalisations. Countries which are ethnically very homogeneous may 
get by with weaker institutions. 
Figure 4 depicts the impact of different combinations of ethnic fractionalisation and executive 
constraints on the duration of declines. The shortest declines are found in the upper left 
corner of the figure, where strong institutions coexist with ethnic homogeneity. The longest 
declines are found in the lower right hand corner, where ethnic homogeneity is low and 
institutions are weak. The top right hand and bottom left hand corners of the figure are 
perhaps the most interesting. In the top right hand corner, declines are short in spite of high 
fractionalisation due to the strength of constraints on the executive. In the bottom left hand 
corner, declines are short because of ethnic homogeneity, in spite of weak institutions. The 
increasing curvature of the contours represents the interaction effect. The authors’ 
                                               
3 Ethnic fractionalisation, in turn, can itself be seen as an outcome of long-term processes of state formation. In 
Africa, colonial boundaries typically disregarded cultural, ethnic and religious divisions. As a result many post 
colonial states were multi-ethnic states, with weak national legitimacy. Colonial policies contributed to 
accentuation of divisions along ethnic lines. On the other hand, historical processes of of nation building in the 
advanced economies contributed to low degrees of ethnic fractionalisation. 
interpretation of these results is that stronger
very high degrees of latent social conflict or fractionalisation. 
 
Figure 4
Further examinations of the robustness of the empirical findings show that the coefficient of 
ethnic fractionalisation is clearly driven by observations from Sub
has the greatest degree of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity of all regions, this is quite plausible. 
As a whole, our results lend broad support to political economy theories 
respective roles of institutions and social conflict. Attempts at effective social coordination 
and responses to slumps are hampered by high degrees of (latent) social conflict as captured 
by ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. But, strong in
legal mechanisms in place that are able contain or resolve these conflicts within the 
institutional framework (as, for example, in North et al., 2009). Also, these results give rise to 
the interesting and rather novel proposition that in less fragmented societies (as measured by 
the index of ethnic heterogeneity), institutions are much less important as a determinant of 
the length of declines. These results do not suggest that sound macroeconomic policies as 
such do not matter, but they provide indications that policy may be secondary to these more 
fundamental factors. 
Finally, these findings show the fruitfulness of decomposing long
into growth episodes and analysing each type of episode 
recoveries – separately. The paper shows that slumps matter a lot for long
performance and that the decline phase of a slump can last very long in some cases. In fact, 
given that growth is relatively easy to ignite but difficult to sustain, a comparison of the 
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relative effects of slumps versus accelerations would be an interesting avenue for future 
research.  
3 Geography versus institutions 
In Economic Development, Growth, Institutions and Geography, Samyukta Bhupatiraju and 
Bart Verspagen revisit questions raised in a well-known paper by Rodrik et al. (2004) with 
regard to the relative importance of institutions, geographic factors and openness to trade as 
determinants of economic growth.  
One of the contributions of the paper is that it uses more comprehensive measures for 
economic performance, for institutions and for geography along with a more commonly used 
measure of trade performance. The paper argues that economic development, institutions and 
geography are all multi-facetted phenomena and to capture them in a single indicator, as is 
often done in the literature is problematic. For institutions, the paper makes use of data from 
the 2009 wave in the Institutional profiles database (IPD, 2009). In developing measures of 
institutions, geographical characteristics and economic performance the paper makes use of 
factor analytic techniques, but with a special spatial characteristic. This is the second 
contribution of the paper. While common factor analytic techniques try to maximise the 
correlation between separate indicators/variables and underlying latent dimensions, the 
regional variant of factor analysis maximises the regional correlations of variables such that 
the factors capture characteristics of existing regions in the world economy.  
Using these new methods, the paper aims at assessing three competing strands of theory 
namely geographic determinism, theories of trade as the engine of growth, and institutional 
theories which emphasise the primacy of growth promoting institutional characteristics. The 
geographic literature emphasises the importance of characteristics such as climate (moderate 
climate is seen as conducive to growth), soil quality, disease environment, location 
(landlockedness is seen as a negative factor, locations with good access to the sea and trade 
routes are seen as positive) and natural resources, such as oil, gas or minerals (which are 
either seen as a blessing or a curse depending on the theory in question). 
Openness to trade and the efficiency gains associated with following international 
comparative advantage have traditionally been seen by economists as an important driver of 
economic growth. It is argued that policies that promote openness will result in more positive 
growth performance. 
Since 1990, institutional economics has argued that the prime factor explaining differences in 
growth performance is the quality and characteristics of institutions. As has been shown in 
the papers of this project institutional characteristics are measured in many ways, such as 
protection against expropriation, strong protection of property rights, the rule of law and 
constraints on executive power, control of violence, a democratic polity, the capacity of the 
state to implement policy and so forth.  
In the econometric analysis of these theories, researchers are always confronted with the 
problem of endogeneity. The factors that supposedly explain growth performance may 
themselves be determined by other factors including growth itself. Thus, growth-friendly 
institutions may be the result of prior successful growth experiences. Trade openness may be 
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a function of good institutions or prior economic development. This makes it difficult to 
identify causal relations in the real world as well as in econometric analysis. One of the 
statistical solutions for the problem of endogeneity is to search for instrumental variables, 
variables that are correlated with the endogenous regressor(s) in question, but not with the 
regression errors (see the paper by Luciana Cingolani and Denis de Crombrugghe, 
Techniques for Dealing with Reverse Causality between Institutions and Growth, UNU-
MERIT Working Paper Series 2012-34/Working Paper Series on Institutions and Economic 
Growth, IPD-WP03.). The present paper also makes use of instrumental variables. Thus 
openness is instrumented by variables from the so-called gravity equation, where the volume 
of trade between two countries depends on factors such as the size of the two economies and 
the distance between them. For institutions, the paper uses instruments such as the mortality 
of colonial settlers (derived from Acemoglu et al. 2001) and related instruments such as the 
proportion of the population speaking English or languages of European descent. 
For institutional variables, the paper makes use of the IPD database. Applying spatial factor 
principal component analysis (SPCA) the paper derives two measures of institutional 
characteristics. It differs from regular PCA in terms of the objective that it sets when 
producing the summary variables (components). In regular PCA, the objective is to maintain 
a maximum fit between the summary component and the original variables. In the spatial 
version of PCA (SPCA), the objective is to produce a summary measure that produces 
maximum spatial correlation with itself. Spatial correlation is measured by the Moran 
coefficient, and is essentially a measure of how spatially concentrated the underlying 
phenomenon is. High spatial correlation means that country with high values on a given 
variable tends to be surrounded by other countries with high values on the same variable (For 
more methodological details the reader is referred to the original paper and Verspagen 2012). 
For institutions, two latent dimensions (components) have been derived. The first component 
is a measure of “Westernness”, similarity to Western type institutions. The advantage of this 
term is that it avoids rather ideological formulations such as good governance or high quality 
institutions. But some of the typical characteristics of this underlying dimension are the 
degree of formalisation of social relationships, democracy, civil rights, transparent justice 
systems and free markets. Broadly speaking, the kind of institutional features that are stressed 
in the second component are those that are associated with a stronger role of the government 
in economic and social life. The following two figures describe the geographic distribution of 
institutional characteristics. 
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Figure 5 Institutions from the IPD database, first component 
 
 
The first component, depicted in figure 5, is clearly a measure of “Western Institutions” 
where the authors use “Western" for describing Europe and its offshoots (North America, 
Australia and New Zealand). 
Figure 6 displays the second component. This is again clearly spatially concentrated but now 
the spatial pattern points to high values in the East as well as in some parts of Europe. 
Broadly speaking the kind of institutional features that are stressed in this second component 
are those that are associated with a stronger role of government in economic and social life. 
Africa is an interesting case, as it shows a broad East-West division in itself. 
 
Figure 6 Institutions from the IPD database, second component. 
 
 
Applying spatial principal component analysis to a variety of geographical variables two 
dimensions are derived. The first is called GEOAREA. It is based on physical characteristics 
such as access to waterways, distance to the equator or climatic zone. The second dimension 
GEOSOIL is based primarily on soil quality indicators. 
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The economic performance measures are also constructed using spatial principal components 
analysis. These indicators are thus clearly broader than conventional measures of GDP per 
capita or growth of GDP per capita. The first component captures the general level of 
development which depends among others on GDP per capita in 2000, share of consumption 
in GDP and - negatively - on population growth. The second component captures overall 
growth in the context of catch up. It depends on a relatively low initial GDP per capita, 
combined with a relatively high growth rate, high openness to trade, high investment rates 
and low population growth. The indicator captures an overall growth or development 
orientation. 
The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. First the endogenous variables institutions 
(INS) and Openness (OPENC) are regressed on other variables, according to the logic of 
instrumental variable regression explained above.  
 
INSi = µ  + φ4ENGFRACi + φ5EURFRACi + φ6 FRi + φ7 GEOAREAi + φ8 GEOSOILi + εINSi  
(1) 
 
OPENCi = γ + φ9ENGFRACi + φ10EURFRACi + φ11 FRi + φ12 GEOAREAi + φ13 GEOSOILi + 
εOPENCi  (2) 
 
where INS stands for institutions  and OPENC for trade openness. GEOAREA and 
GEOSOIL are the geographic variables, ENGFRAC is the % of English speakers and 
EURFRAC is the percentage of the population speaking European languages. 
FR is the Frankel Romer instrument for foreign trade, which captures the geographic 
influences on trade as a percentage of GDP. FR is estimated in a separate gravity regression 
equation. Note that the regression for institutions is run twice, once for the first component 
and once for the second component. 
Subsequently the predicted values of Institutions and Openness are entered in the final 
equation with the three key variables: Institutions, Openness and Geography: 
log yi =α + β1 INSi + β2OPENCi+ β3GEOSOILi + εi    (3) 
This regression is run in four different versions: 1. taking the first development component as 
the dependent variable and using the first institutional dimension as an explanatory variable 
2. taking the first development component as the dependent variable and using the second 
institutional dimension as an explanatory variable; 3. taking the second development 
component as the dependent variable and using the first institutional dimension as an 
explanatory variable; 4. taking the second development component as the dependent variable 
and using the second institutional dimension as an explanatory variable. The paper also 
compares specifications using variables derived with regular principal components analysis 
and variables derived with spatial principle component variables. Note that the analysis in 
this paper is cross-sectional in nature.  
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The findings of the paper can be summarised as follows: 
1. Institutions and trade openness are indeed endogenous variables, so that instrumental 
variable analysis is required (the two stage procedure described above). 
2. The results point to an important role of institutions in explaining the level of development. 
The two institutional variables are the only ones that are systematically significant in the two- 
stage instrumental variable regressions. The first component - Western type institutions - has 
the clearest positive relation with level of development. In this sense the analysis is in line 
with that of Rodrik et al. (2004).  
3. The geographic approach to measurement makes a significant difference. Comparing 
normal principal components analysis (PCA) with spatial principal components analysis 
(SPCA), institutions do not have a robust significant effect on level of development using 
PCA versions of the variables. They do when one uses SPCA. The authors conclude that  
“institutions indeed are a (the) primal factor behind economic development, but only if we 
take into account that institutions themselves are strongly geographically concentrated’’ 
(Bhupatiraju and Verspagen, 2013, p.18). Even of one does not see a direct impact of 
geography on levels of economic development, one should keep in mind that the institutional 
variables are spatially weighted, so that ‘space’ does matter.  
The implications of these spatial analyses are that one should think less abstractly about 
institutional characteristics. They are not unique to a single country, but develop in spatial 
contexts. These spatial contexts are characterized by shared historical experiences.  
4. Taking the second growth related economic performance variable as dependent variable 
the results are very different. First, institutions are not the only factor. Trade and geography 
also contribute to explaining economic performance. Trade openness has a positive effect as 
does soil quality. Next, the “Western Institutions” variable seems to contribute negatively to 
development. This reflects the fact that the countries experiencing rapid growth and catch up 
are presently typically non-Western economies. Somewhat surprisingly the second 
institutional variable, government role in the economy, does not have a significant effect. The 
conclusion is that institutions no longer trump the other factors when one considers a more 
dynamic picture of economic development. 
5. Generally the instruments that are available so far are rather weak, which means that 
conclusions have to be cautious. One of the important avenues for future research is to find 
stronger instrumental variables that are available for large samples of countries. 
 
4 Institutional determinants of investment behaviour 
 
The previous two papers discussed above examine the connections between institutional 
characteristics and measures of aggregate economic performance (duration of slumps, levels 
of economic development, and growth rates of GDP per capita). The two papers discussed in 
this section try to unbundle the relationships between institutions and economic development, 
by focusing on one of the key intermediate drivers of economic performance namely 
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investment. Questions to be examined in this context are: how do institutional characteristics 
affect the volume of foreign and domestic investment, how does foreign investment affect the 
volume of domestic investment, do foreign firms invest more than domestic firms and in 
general what are the determinants of investment behaviour?  
4.1 How do institutions influence the effects of FDI on domestic 
investment? 
 
In Institutions, Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Investment: Crowding Out or 
Crowding in?, Kristine Farla, Denis de Crombrugghe and Bart Verspagen examine important 
questions about foreign direct investment and its relationships with domestic investment. 
In the present day international economic order foreign direct investment is widely seen as a 
key factor in the economic development of LDCs and emerging economies. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is the type of capital inflow from abroad that is most directly related to the 
productive capacity of a country. Its effect of transferring foreign know-how and technology, 
creating additional investment funds and even improving labour standards is often seen as 
one of the important benefits of globalisation for growth and development of relatively poor 
countries. Its importance as a source of external finance has increased dramatically, now far 
exceeding the contributions of aid flows. Many countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa 
have adopted special policies to attract foreign investment, including investment treaties, 
preferential taxation schemes and preferential loans. Countries that were previously closed 
and hostile to FDI such as China and India now welcome such investment. While post-war 
Japan and South Korea kept foreign investors at arm’s length and found other ways to acquire 
foreign technological knowledge, the increasing control of technological knowledge by 
multinationals seems to make FDI indispensable for access to technology and economic 
growth. 
This paper takes a critical look at FDI and its assumed benefits. It singles out the following 
questions for empirical analysis:  
- What is the effect of foreign investment on the volume of private investment and the 
volume of gross fixed capital formation? Will an inflow of FDI result in more private 
investment (Crowding In) or in less private investment (crowding out)? Will an inflow of 
FDI result in more gross fixed capital formation (crowding in) or less gross fixed capital 
formation (crowding out). 
-  Which institutional characteristics contribute to higher levels of private investment 
(foreign as well as domestic)? It is generally accepted that private investors will prefer to 
invest in countries with secure property rights and a stable institutional setting. Thus, good 
governance is expected to have a positive effect on overall private investment. 
-  What role do institutions and governance have on the relationship between FDI and total 
investment, more specifically on whether FDI crowds in or crowds out domestic private 
investment?  
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Additional questions raised in the paper, though not explicitly incorporated in the empirical 
analysis are: 
-  If there is crowding out, does this have a positive effect on the productivity of domestic 
firms, if market entry of foreign owned firms pushes the least efficient domestic firms out 
of the market? 
-  Does FDI have positive productivity spillovers (through transfer of know-how or 
technology) to domestic firms? 
-  Are foreign-owned firms more productive than domestic firms? 
 
The relations between institutions, FDI and domestic investment as described in the 
secondary literature are very complex. It is not surprising that the findings of the literature are 
so far inconclusive. The following mechanisms and relationships can be identified in the 
literature: 
a  Corruption tends to have negative effects on the volume of domestic private investment. 
Improved governance will have a positive effect on domestic private investment. 
b  Institutions such as legal protection, rule of law, investment treaties, trade agreements, 
political stability, government efficiency, control of corruption and financial supervision 
have positive effects on the inflow of FDI. 
c If FDI itself is motivated by rent seeking, increasing inflows of FDI will crowd out 
domestic investment. 
d.  Investment unfriendly regimes (bad governance) have a negative effect on domestic 
private investment. As foreign investors have more leverage, domestic investors may turn 
to foreign partners. Thus, the negative effects of bad governance on total investment may 
be somewhat mitigated by increases in inward FDI, but the share of domestic investment 
will decline. So this results in crowding out of domestic private investment. 
e  Elite rent seeking (in the tradition of North et al., 2009) may influence the behaviour of 
foreign and domestic investors. In limited access orders (LAOs) elites capture rents by 
reducing competition, limiting access to trade and resources and restricting entry to 
organisations. One possible effect on investment is that rent seeking by members of elite 
coalitions may have stronger negative effects on domestic investors than on foreign 
investors. Domestic elites may have reasons to grant foreign investors preferential market 
access. Thus, domestic investors who do not have access to elites are excluded and may be 
crowded out. In this case, rent seeking by domestic elites (bad governance) would be 
positively related to FDI inflows, but domestic investors would be crowded out. These 
outcomes are similar to those discussed in the previous paragraph, but the mechanisms are 
somewhat different. 
f  Alternatively domestic elites may impose stronger restrictions on foreign ownership in 
industries where they collect large rents from domestic investment. If this is the case, high 
levels of rent seeking by domestic elites will be negatively related to FDI inflows. Under 
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such conditions, better governance would result in more inflows of FDI and less 
restrictions on domestic private investment. The interactions between governance and FDI 
would be positive. If both positive and negative mechanisms operate simultaneously in 
different sectors of the economy, the net effects may be hard to disentangle.  
g  Finally, institutions may affect the spillovers from foreign to domestic firms. Certain 
institutions - e.g. strong intellectual property rights - may encourage high-tech investments 
and positive knowledge spillovers. If these spillovers are high, FDI will crowd in domestic 
investment because it raises the rates of return to domestic private investment. In this case, 
the interaction effects between institutions and FDI would be positive. Better institutions, 
encourage more FDI and result in more spillovers, and therefore in less crowding out. 
Thus, there is a variety of possible positive and negative mechanisms with regard to the 
effects of institutions and governance on crowding in or crowding effects of FDI. The paper 
attempts to examine the effects of FDI using a regression framework for a panel dataset of 
developing and emerging countries. In this analysis a negative sign of the coefficients of 
interaction terms between FDI and governance indicators is interpreted as an indication that 
the rent seeking effects of FDI  (argument e) are stronger than the positive effects of FDI 
spillovers (argument g). A positive sign is interpreted in the opposite fashion, the positive 
effects of FDI spillovers are stronger than any negative effects of rent seeking.4 
The starting point for the analysis is an equation derived from Morrissey and 
Udomkerdmongkol (2012): 
DPIi,t = β0 + β1DPIi,t-1 + β2FDIi,t+ β3GROWTHi,t + β4PUBLICi,t + β5WGIi,t  
  + β6WGIi,t * FDIi,t  + εi,t.        (4) 
Here, DPI is domestic private investment as a fraction of GDP, FDI is FDI as a percentage of 
GDP, PUBLIC is public investment as a percentage of GDP, GROWTH is past GDP growth, 
and WGI is one of several indicators on governance and institutions. WGI*FDI represents the 
interaction between institutional characteristics and FDI. Empirical analysis based on this 
equation generally results in a significant negative effect of FDI on domestic private 
investment, i.e. crowding out.  
However, the paper goes on to criticise the Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (M&U) 
specification and develops various alternative specifications, all of which point to crowding 
in effects. 
The contributions of the paper lie in two areas, namely improved estimation techniques and 
better separation of FDI from private investment. The paper proposes several modifications 
to the system GMM specifications. for which the reader is referred to the original paper. With 
regard to data, one of the problems in the literature is the separation of FDI from domestic 
investment, which is far from easy. National accounts indicators of investment such as Gross 
                                               
4 Note that the interpretation of the interaction term is open to discussion. Different arguments involve different 
kinds of rent seeking, e.g. by domestic elites (argument e) or by foreign firms (argument c). Argument f also 
provides a setting where the sign of the interaction term would be positive: better institutions result in more FDI 
and less restrictions on domestic investors. There is no empirical way in which we can distinguish between the 
various interpretations of the interaction term, but the one chosen in the main text seems the most plausible one.  
21 
 
Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) include both domestic and foreign investment. Next, GFCF 
focuses on new capital formation, while FDI is a financial balance of payments concept. FDI 
includes both investment in existing capacity (e.g. takeovers) and investment in newly 
installed capacity (Greenfield investment). Thus the non-Greenfield part of FDI is not part of 
GFCF. A further problem is that while Greenfield FDI is a part of GFCF, GFCF may also 
include foreign-controlled investment that is not included in Greenfield investment. This is 
the case when an existing firm that is foreign-owned invests in the domestic economy using 
part of its own profits. Also, FDI is often measured as a net flow (the net balance of inward 
and outward FDI), while to be consistent with GFCF, only inflows of FDI should be taken 
into account.  
The paper experiments with a range of alternative investment concepts and concludes that the 
choice of the investment concept has a large impact on the empirical conclusions. All of the 
regressions with these alternative investment variables as dependent variable point to 
crowding in, rather than crowding out.  
Investment concepts used as dependent variables in this paper include the following: 
-  Private Investment (PI). Using the dataset of Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (M&U), 
the authors construct a measure of private investment PI as the sum of domestic private 
investment (DPI) and inflows of FDI.  
-  Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF). Using the data of M&U, GFCF is calculated as 
the sum of private investment (PI) and public investment (PUBLIC). 
-  Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF*) from the World Development Indicators 
- Investment share of PPP converted GDP per capita (GCF) from the Penn world Tables 
With regard to the explanatory variables, the authors also add a variable measuring the stock 
of FDI as a ratio of GDP (STOCK) from UNCTAD.  
The variable used to measure institutional quality (WWGI) is constructed as follows. The 
authors use the Kaufmann et al. data which M&U treated using an unobserved components 
model and construct a composite and dichotomous governance indicator. WWGI is 
constructed by estimating the first principal component of the governance indicators used by 
M&U. The principal component is denoted WWGIPC. The authors construct a dummy 
variable that has the value '1' when a given country scores higher than the 50th percentile on 
WWGIPC (in every year).  
In some of the regressions the authors add more specific indicators for private and public rent 
seeking behaviour, using the perception-based indicators from the Global Competitiveness 
Index (WCI), which are collected by the World Economic Forum. 
The authors examine a wide range of regression specifications in the light of the 
methodological discussion regarding concepts and estimation methods. The substantive 
results of the paper can be summarised as follows. 
- Overall the findings suggest that the accuracy of the results in the literature are severely 
affected by the empirical difficulties in disentangling foreign capital formation from 
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domestic capital formation and by choice of estimation methods, in particular the 
implementation of the GMM methods. 
- In a wide range of specifications in this paper, foreign direct investment positively 
influences a country’s domestic level of investment. Thus, there is strong evidence for 
crowding in rather than for crowding out. This strongly contradicts results of earlier 
research and is one of the main findings of the paper. 
- There is weak evidence that higher scores on governance indicators have a positive effect 
on private investment, implying that better governance results in higher rates of private 
investment (private investment being the sum of domestic private investment and foreign 
direct investment).This suggests that improvements in governance would result in higher 
rates of domestic as well as foreign investment. 
- The signs of the coefficients of interaction terms between good governance and FDI are 
consistently negative and significant. Thus, on the basis of the interaction between good 
governance and FDI, there is a negative mediating effect of good governance on both total 
private investment and total gross fixed capital formation. This is because the overall 
positive relation between FDI and private investment (Crowding In) is weakened. Good 
governance has a negative effect on the relationship between FDI and private investment. 
The authors' interpretation of this finding is that under good governance there may be 
more inflows of foreign investment. But rent seeking (argument e above) results in foreign 
investors’ preferential access to certain sectors of the economy, at the expense of domestic 
private investors. According to the authors, the empirical results suggest that the negative 
effects of rent seeking dominate the possible positive effects of spillovers 
This is an interesting and not uncontroversial finding, which however does raise some further 
questions. On first sight, one would expect improvements in governance to be associated with 
less private and public rent seeking activity rather than more. Also, most of the interaction 
terms used do not really allow the researchers to distinguish between rent seeking behaviour 
by domestic political elites, domestic investors or multinational firms. Unscrambling these 
interactions is a challenging and interesting avenue for future research. A better 
understanding of how institutional and policy reforms impact on rent seeking behaviours of 
different kinds of investors is of considerable policy relevance. 
4.2 Do institutions have an impact on the contribution of Foreign 
Investment to economic development? 
In the previous paper, the relationships between institutional characteristics, foreign 
investment and domestic investment were investigated at macro-level. But relationships at 
macro-level may mask a great variety of firm investment behaviours at the micro-level. In 
Determinants of Firms’ Investment Behaviour: A Multilevel approach, Kristine Farla raises 
the question to what extent firm-level factors influence investment behaviour, using micro-
datasets. She combines this with macro-analysis by also entering country level characteristics 
into the analysis, thus providing an example of multilevel analysis. This paper continues the 
process of unbundling the relationships between institutions and economic performance by 
focusing on one specific important economic variable, namely the investment behaviour of 
firms.  
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The main questions addressed in the paper are twofold. First, do foreign owned firms invest 
more than domestic firms? Second, to what extent does a country’s institutional, political 
stability and macro-economic environment affect investment behaviour? 
With regard to the first question, the author notes that if foreign investors have better access 
to finance, attracting foreign investors (i.e. in terms of equity ownership shares) can be an 
important source for the accumulation of capital. On the other hand, foreign investors may 
choose to operate relatively more intensely in industries that require less long-term 
investment commitments. With regard to the second question, there is a large macroeconomic 
literature that suggests a strong relation between institutions, political stability, and 
investment (see also section 4.1). The multilevel set up of this paper allows the researcher to 
analyse such relationships using both macro data at country level and firm-level micro data. 
The study is primarily based on firm data from the World Bank Enterprises Surveys. The 
dataset covers the period 2006-2011. The dataset comprises 45480 firms, 121 surveys and 
data for 101 developing and emerging economies (20 countries are surveyed twice). In the 
process of data cleaning 14759 firms are excluded from the analysis. 
There are two dependent variables in this study, namely the decision to invest (does a firm 
invest in a given year) and the intensity of investment (the investment to sales ratio in a given 
year).  
Foreign ownership is measured with help of dummy variables. The first dummy takes the 
value of one if there is any foreign ownership of firms. The second dummy takes the value 
one if there is full foreign ownership (100 per cent). Additional micro level variables are firm 
size (number of employees), labour costs (as ratio of sales revenue), export orientation (a 
dummy variable with value one if a firm has any exports) and economic sector. Three dummy 
variables measure perceived obstacles that could inhibit investment, namely lack of access to 
land, lack of access to finance and competition from informal sector firms 
The following macro variables are included in the analysis as control variables. The author 
controls for real GDP per capita (GDP) in constant prices, and growth measured as the 
logarithmic change in GDP with respect to the previous year (Growth) from Heston et al. 
(2012). Moreover, she control’s for a country's degree of de jure financial openness using 
data collected by Chinn and Ito (2008) (updated to 2010) and de facto trade openness  using 
data from Heston et al. (2012). In addition, the author controls for the percentage of real 
interest rates using data from World Bank (2012). 
A country's institutional characteristics are measured using two proxies. First, property rights 
protection (Property) is measured using data from the Heritage Foundation (2013).11 Second, 
data from Transparency International (2011) is used to measure control of corruption (CPI). 
Additionally a proxy for political stability is used from Marshall and Jaggers (2009) in the 
regression analysis. Polity2 measures the degree to which the political regime of a country 
approximates either a democratic or an autocratic regime. Higher values of Polity2 
correspond to more democracy.  
 
The basic multilevel regression model takes the following form: 
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y*ij = β1 + β′2 x1ij + β′3x2j + εij + νj     (5) 
 
Where y is the latent investment variable, i  refers to the firm and j to the country. 
x1ij is a vector with the firm-level explanatory variables. x2 is a vector of country-level 
variables. The composite error component contains a micro-level error term εij and a macro-
level error term νj. 
This model is subsequently extended to include the possible effects of institutions and 
political economy on the relationship between foreign ownership and investment. This is 
done by adding two interaction terms: 
 
y*ij = β1 + β′2 x1ij + β′3x2j + β 4P-Foreign * Gij + β 5P-Foreign100 * Gij + εij + νj  (6) 
Here P-Foreign * Gij represents the interaction between P-Foreign (partially foreign-owned 
firm) and an institutional variable (either Property, CPI or Polity 2). P-Foreign100 * Gij is the 
interaction term for 100 per cent foreign-owned firms. 
 
The substantive findings of the paper can be summarised as follows: 
 
- In conformity with previous studies, this study finds that most firms simply do not invest 
in any given year. Given prevailing levels of uncertainty the irreversibility of investment 
in fixed capital goods is a strong obstacle to investment.  
- With regard to the decision to invest, there is significant relationship between partial 
foreign ownership and the frequency of investing. There is some - weak - evidence - that 
fully foreign owned firms invest less frequently. 
- More importantly completely foreign-owned firms invest significantly less in fixed capital 
(in terms of the investment-sales ratio) than domestic firms. Such differences are not 
found for partially foreign-owned firms. A tentative conclusion would therefore be that 
limiting the extent of foreign ownership would have a positive influence on the rate of 
investment, as long as this does not discourage the overall inflow of foreign investment. 
There is a caveat that the average negative relationship between complete foreign ownership 
and the level of investment does not hold for all countries. In a minority of the countries in 
the sample there is even a positive relationship between foreign equity ownership and 
investment. 
A rather surprising finding of the paper is that macro-economic and institutional factors have 
relatively little explanatory power with regard to the level of firms’ investment. However, 
they do have a significant impact on the probability that a firm actually invests.  
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5 Institutions, state capacities and development 
 
The previous two papers attempted to analyse some of the specific channels through which 
institutional characteristics can influence economic performance. The specific channel was 
investment behaviour and how it responds to the incentives provided by the institutional 
structure. Now we shift to another interesting channel, namely state capacity and its potential 
contributions to economic performance. State capacity is analysed in two separate papers. 
The first paper by Luciana Cingolani, The State of State Capacity A Review of Concepts, 
Evidence and Measures provides an analytic review of the huge literature on state capacity 
and its consequences. The second paper by Luciana Cingolani, Kaj Thomsson and Denis de 
Crombrugghe uses empirical measures of state capacity to see whether and how state 
capacity affects the realisation of the millennium development goals in a sample of countries. 
5.1 The state of state capacities: a review 
No attempt will be made to provide a comprehensive summary of a paper, which itself 
provides a review, synthesis and summary of a very large body of literature. Rather, we will 
highlight certain elements and insights derived from the state capacity literature, which are 
deemed important from the perspective of the wider project on institutions and long-run 
economic performance. We will also pay attention to measures and indicators of state 
capacity. 
The concept of state capacity emerges from debates about the role of the state in development 
in the second half of the twentieth century. This debate can be interpreted as a struggle with 
the Marxist legacy, which viewed the state as part of the superstructure of society, that was 
completely determined by economic forces and class interests. The state represented the 
executive committee of the ruling classes and had no autonomy of its own. From classical 
sociologists such as Max Weber onwards, this determinist perspective on the state was 
rejected. The state was conceived of as a (relatively) autonomous actor. The formation of 
stable states came to be seen as an interesting topic for research in its own right and as one of 
the preconditions for successful economic development. Once the autonomous role of the 
state was accepted, the quality of state actions and the capacity of the state to pursue 
developmental goals and implement policies became an interesting topic for research and 
debate. One the important contributions of the review paper is that it shows that the state is 
not a monolith. There are many dimensions of state capacities and it is important to unbundle 
them. 
In the classical literature on the state a few recurrent themes surface which continue to play a 
role in current debates. These themes include the capacity of the state to extract revenue from 
the population in the face of external or internal challenges. Participation in wars was one of 
the factors that spurred the need to extract revenue. A second theme is the maintenance of 
territorial integrity and internal peace in a given territory. This involves a state monopoly on 
the use of violence. A third major theme is the capacity to implement policies and realise 
official goals, even in the face of opposition by powerful groups in society. A final theme is 
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that of bureaucratic capabilities, which include autonomy, professionalisation, recruitment on 
basis of merit, and internal coordination.  
In the modern literature, as reviewed in the paper by Cingolani, one can distinguish two 
major questions:  
1. How do state capacities affect the outcomes of socio-economic development? 
2. What are the determinants of state capacities and how could state capacities be improved? 
5.1.1 State capacity and outcomes 
In the literature state capacity has also been linked to a great variety of outcomes. These 
include: 
• growth and economic performance (or the absence thereof) 
• innovation  
• structural change and industrialisation 
• levels of internal violence and criminality 
• prevention of civil wars and conflicts  
• war contagion  
• the implementation of peace agreements 
• delivery of public goods 
• social protection 
 
The paper pays special attention to three sets of these outcomes: economic growth, 
industrialisation and conflict. 
State capacity and economic growth,  
The following elements of state capacity are considered to contribute positively to economic 
growth 
• bureaucratic professionalisation 
• meritocratic recruitment of personnel 
• an unpoliticised bureaucracy 
• predictable legal systems 
• the capacity to enforce property rights (already discussed in the previous sections) 
• fiscal capacity, the capacity to raise revenue to public goals and objectives. (It is well-
known that many developing countries have underdeveloped fiscal capacities). 
• coercive capacity: the capacity of the state to enforce pacification of the territory of the 
state. 
• limitations to the power of the executive through a system of institutional checks and 
balances.  
• limits to corruption 
There is an especially interesting tension between coercive capacity and limitations and 
constraints on the executive and on the state in general. In many developing countries the 
problem is conceived to be that of ‘weak’ states which lack the power to tax, regulate and 
pacify (Acemoglu 2005). But, at the same time institutional limitations to the - arbitrary - 
powers of the state are seen as a very important element of state capacities. 
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State capacity, structural change and industrialisation. 
A special subset of the literature focuses on the transformative capacity of the state. Can 
public policy contribute to changes in the structure of the economy, industrialisation, and 
technological upgrading? This literature is especially - though not exclusively - oriented 
towards the analysis of catch up in countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. The 
key words here are autonomy and embeddedness. The state needs to be sufficiently isolated 
from political interest groups within and without government in order to pursue long term 
developmental goals. But it needs to be sufficiently embedded in the economy to interact 
intensively with productive actors (Evans, 1995). The task of such developmental states is to 
achieve strategic integration into global trade at terms beneficial to the country. Such 
developmental states are highly interventionist, but have specific bureaucratic and 
administrative capabilities that make such interventions possible. In the absence of the 
required capabilities, interventions will be less effective, or in the worst case of predatory 
states even detrimental to economic development. 
State capacity and Conflict; fragile states 
As previously discussed, one of the key task of the state apparatus is to maintain internal 
peace through a monopoly of violence. This is perhaps one of the most basic functions of 
states. When states do not have the sufficient capabilities, society will descend into civil wars 
and civil conflicts. The end result will be a fragile or even a failed state, where the capacity to 
maintain internal pacification has been undermined. Factors conducive to breakdown of 
internal peace include low financial, organisational and political state capacities, the inability 
of the state apparatus and the political system to channel social demands in a way that limits 
to possibilities of rebels. Lack of state capacity reduces chances to resist the spread of 
regional conflicts. However, it is not so much the coercive capacity of the state that favours 
internal peace as the existence of an effective bureaucracy. 
For the role of the state in controlling violence the work of North, Wallis and Weingast 
(2009) is of special interest. This literature has already been reviewed in Bluhm and Szirmai 
(2012), but it also plays a prominent role in the state capacity literature. Control of violence is 
conceived of as the most fundamental problem faced by human societies. Throughout most of 
human history such control has been achieved by elite coalitions, who reap rents by limiting 
access of broad layers of the population to economic and social organisations. Such 
institutional arrangements are referred to as natural states - or limited access orders. They use 
these rents to negotiate settlements with other elites to achieve a rather fragile equilibrium. 
These equilibria are achieved when the distribution of political power is more or less in 
balance with the distribution of economic rents. The more personalistic the ties between the 
elites, the more fragile the social order is. Starting from the rule of law for elites, the 
establishment of a monopoly of violence and consolidated control of the military and the 
emergence of organisations which outlive the lives of their founders and rules (perpetually 
lived organisations), limited access orders can been transformed into more stable open access 
orders. Cingolani reinterprets this transition as a new conceptualisation of the traditional 
Weberian perspective of bureaucratic professionalisation and the emergence of insulated state 
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structures that guarantee the stability of public goods beyond personalistic and contingent 
situations.  
5.1.2 What are the determinants of state capacities and how can state capacities 
be improved? 
 
An important strand of the literature emphasises how participation in external conflicts and 
wars has influenced the emergence and development of state capacities. From this 
perspective, regions that have experienced more international warfare also tend to have more 
developed state capacities. In contrast, outbreaks of internal violence tend to weaken state 
capacity. An interesting insight from this literature is that state capacities both have to be 
strengthened and have to be constrained. Without limits to executive power and expropriation 
through democratic institutions and the rule of law, states tend to become predatory and 
extractive. 
From a policy perspective it is perhaps more helpful to focus on the processes, mechanisms 
and reforms that can improve state capacity. Greatly simplifying, one can see a trade-off 
between investment in state capabilities which foster long-run growth and development and 
the sustained provision of public services and short-run investments in the state apparatus as 
an instrument for holding on to power and extracting rents. There is a permanent temptation 
to focus on the short-term political future of the incumbents at the expense of long-run 
investments. The more the bureaucracy is isolated from the political cycle, the greater the 
chances of improvements in long-run state capacity. 
Cutting through the details in the literature over and over again the same elements emerge for 
improving state capacity. These are much the same elements that have been mentioned in the 
context of the relationship between state capacity and economic growth: 
• Reforms resulting in professionalisation of the bureaucracy. 
• Merit oriented administrative reform, meritocratic recruitment and career 
mechanisms.  
• Increased transparency of procedures and reduction of arbitrary personalistic decision 
making and corruption. 
• Establishment of rule of law which makes contracts predictable and places limits to 
the power of the executive. 
• Increasing the ability of government to tax broader segments of the population 
including the rich and the powerful and thus raise revenue. Broadening the tax base 
also involves broadening the types of incomes and assets that can be taxed. In many 
countries with a weak tax base, the two main sources of incomes are taxes on exports 
and taxes on land. 
• Increased efficiency in the provision of public goods. 
• Increased ability to implement redistributive policies aimed at reducing extreme social 
inequalities in order to maintain social harmony.  
The key insight emerging from this literature is that state capacity itself is a result of 
investment decisions by elites. The question is what incentives can be developed for 
investment in state capacity building. 
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5.1.3 Measurement of state capacities 
The review paper by Cingolani makes clear that state capacity is a multi-dimensional 
concept. The following seven dimensions need to be taken into account when attempting to 
measure state capacity. 
Coercive capacity 
The most basic attribute of state capacity is the state's capacity to monopolise coercive power 
in a given territory. This refers to the military capacity of states to control the territory by 
discouraging internal conflict and protecting the borders from external invasion.  
Measures compiled within the state fragility literature, include the State Failure Index (Polity 
IV); the State Fragility Index, the Index of State Weakness, the Fragility Index (from Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy), the Failed State Index, Failure of Task Force, Forecast of State 
Failure (Fortin 2010). 
Fiscal capacity 
This dimension emphasises the state's power to extract resources from the society, mainly in 
the form of tax. Measures of revenue raising are proxies for such capacity. They include 
measures such as government revenue, or government spending as share of GDP, the 
distribution of central and local taxes and the nature of the tax system. 
Administrative / Implementation capacity 
The administrative capacity of the state is rooted in the Weberian tradition regarding the 
modern state and the existence of a professional and insulated bureaucracy. This type of 
bureaucracy outlives rulers and is deemed essential for the impersonal implementation of 
laws and policies. In general, it is conceived that implementation capacity develops only after 
an effective establishment of sovereignty and a stable military control over territory. It 
requires both skilled officials and financial resources. This dimension of state capacity is 
perhaps the most widely referred to in the literature, and is closely related to good governance 
(e.g. Fukuyama 2004, 2013). 
Transformative, industrialisation capacity 
Another strand looks at the state's capacity to intervene in a productive system and shape the 
economy. From here stems most of the ‘developmental state’ literature that looks at 
industrialisation capacity. Some of these works are also loyal to a Weberian approach by 
contending that a balanced combination of professional cadres in the bureaucracy, proper 
levels of intra-state agency coordination and a certain degree of state `embeddedness' in the 
productive structure are the key to transformative capacity. In a similar vein, others look not 
only to transformative capacity but also distributive and innovative capacity (e.g. Weiss 
1998). 
Relational capacity 
The state's relational capacity is perhaps of a broader nature than the other dimensions. It 
seeks to capture the extent to which the state actually permeates through the society and is 
able to internalise social interactions within its own actions. Relational capacity looks at 
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socio-economic engagement, as opposed to the `command-hierarchy' traditional view of the 
state. For example, the idea of infrastructural power - the capacity to implement decisions 
throughout the jurisdiction - as something opposed to the despotic power to dictate legislation 
reflects this dimension of state capacity, perhaps closely related to implementation capacity. 
The idea of infrastructural capacity has been understood as a) the administrative capabilities 
of the central state; b) territorial reach; c) the power of the state's `radiating institutions', how 
the state affects and is limited by civil society. Because of all these interpretations, relational 
capacity often encompasses several of the other dimensions. 
Legal capacity 
The legal dimension of state capacity has its roots in the `limited government' strand of the 
literature, in which special attention is given to the limitation of state's intervention. 
Limitation happens through the existence of a stable legal system that enables credible 
commitments and contract enforcement (North 1981; Besley and Persson 2007, 2009). In this 
literature, state capacity is usually captured through the levels of bureaucratic corruption (e.g. 
Acemoglu and Verdier 1998) or executive checks (Acemoglu 2001).  
Political capacity 
In this dimension, state capacity is equated with political leverage or policymaking capacity. 
It often refers to the level of power accumulation by elected leaders in order to enforce their 
policy priorities across the different institutional players (party, Congress, etc.). This 
literature looks at veto power and executive checks, often sharing insights with the legal 
capacities literature. 
The various empirical measurement instruments and operationalisations are summarised in 
table 1. 
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Table 1: Measures of state capacity
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5.2 State capacities, bureaucratic autonomy and the millennium 
development goals 
The paper on state capacity, bureaucratic autonomy and millennium development goals by 
Luciana Cingolani, Kaj Thommson and Denis de Crombrugghe provides an empirical 
application of the studies reviewed in the previous paper and the previous section. It focuses 
specifically on one of the key element of state capacity, namely autonomy of the 
bureaucracy.5 
Empirical measures of bureaucratic autonomy are scarce. As a proxy for wider levels of 
bureaucratic autonomy, the authors propose to focus on the autonomy of central banks, for 
which data can be found. They develop the following de facto measure of bureaucratic 
autonomy of central banks, based on the nature of appointments of central governors. They 
                                               
5 This paper also contains a further review of the literature. The review of the previous section is actually based 
on both papers. Here we will focus on the substantive findings of the second paper. Elements of the literature 
review have been incorporated in the previous section. 
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contrast regular replacement of central bank governors with irregular replacement based on 
political meddling or intervention. 
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In this equation RegTor represents regular turnovers of central bank governors and IrregTOR 
represents irregular turnovers. Data are available for the frequency of regular and irregular 
turnovers in 88 countries over the period 1970-2011. The index has a rather straightforward 
interpretation: negative measures represent that most of the turnovers have been irregular and 
positives represent the opposite. More occurrences of regular turnovers are interpreted as a 
indication of more autonomy for the central banking agency.  
The authors start their analysis by describing the correlations between their measure of 
bureaucratic autonomy and other indictors of state capacity based on commonly available 
datasets. In doing so, they divide their observations into three subsets: those for democracies, 
those for autocracies and for an in-between category denoted as anocracies. A country in a 
given year is defined as an autocracy if the index Polity2 from the database Polity IV is less 
than -5; anocracies are between -5 and 5 and democracies are those above 5 (Marshall, 
Jaggers and Gurr, 2010).  
The correlations between autonomy and other measures of state capacity are reproduced in 
the table 2. In this table most of the variables measuring state capacity are negatively 
correlated with bureaucratic autonomy within the sub-sample of autocracies. There is a 
positive and significant relationship in democracies. No clear pattern emerges for anocracies. 
The authors tentatively conclude that bureaucratic autonomy and state capacity tend to 
converge in the context of consolidated democracies. However, they significantly differ in 
anocracies and autocracies. In these types of polities, state capacity, if any, arises from 
sources other than bureaucratic autonomy. But, the authors warn that the indicator of 
autonomy may only capture the level of autonomy of the whole bureaucracy in democratic 
settings. The search for more sophisticated measures of bureaucratic autonomy is one of the 
obvious avenues for future research.  
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Table 2: 
Correlations between bureaucratic autonomy and other measures of state capacity 
Dimension State Capacity measure Autocracies Anocracies Democracies 
Administrative Bureaucratic Quality (ICRG)  0.1466**  0.1234*** 0.2207*** 
 Control of corruption (ICRG) 0.0856*  0.1500***  0.1706*** 
 Control of corruption (HF) -0.1564** 0.0819 0.1117*** 
 CPI (TI) -0.0685 0.1329* 0.1392*** 
Legal Property rights (HF) -0.0526 0.2024*** 0.0623* 
 Rule of Law (WB) -0.4110*** 0.0232 0.0591* 
 Contract intensive money (WDI) -0.3026*** 0.0385 -0.0207 
Fiscal Government Revenue (WDI) 0.0490 -0.0989 0.1001*** 
 Income Tax (% total taxes - WDI) -0.3433*** 0.1330** 0.1035*** 
 Income Tax (% of revenue- WDI) -0.1950** 0.1643*** 0.1265*** 
 1- Trade tax -0.5006*** -0.0392 -0.0656* 
 1- (Trade tax + Inc tax) -0.1417* -0.1501** -0.2350* 
 Inc tax * Gov revenue -0.1350* 0.0029 0.1325* 
 Tax rev 0.2670*** -0.0544 0.0952*** 
 Primary commodity exports (R*) 0.1096*** 0.1489*** -0.0584*** 
 Tax from exports 0.3356*** 0.1180 -0.0527 
Coercive Military Personnel (COW) -0.1975*** -0.1653*** -0.0723*** 
 Log of Military Expend (COW) -0.3537*** -0.3064*** 0.1046*** 
 State Fragility (Pol4) -0.2776***  0.0871 -0.0350 
Others Inflation (WDI) (R*) 0.0099 -0.0336 -0.0417** 
 Road Density (WDI) -0.1634 0.5408*** -0.0207 
 Military in Politics (ICRG) -0.0751 0.3176*** 0.1074*** 
 Log GDP/c -0.385*** -0.0117 0.1039* 
Note: R* is a reversed scale, meaning that higher values of the variable represent 
less capacity. 
 
In the final section of the paper, the authors take the creative step of linking indicators of state 
capacity to the successful realisation of the millennium development goals. The expectation 
is that countries that score high on various measures of state capacity will achieve more 
success in reaching the MDGs. Two of the MDG indicators are selected for the analysis, 
namely changes in child mortality and changes in tuberculosis incidence rates.  
The explanatory variables include operationalisations of different dimensions of state 
capacity: 
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• Yearly differences in the proxy for bureaucratic autonomy (discussed above). 
• Yearly changes in tax revenue as share of GDP (from IMF sources)  
• A dichotomous variable for democracy: score 1 meaning that countries score higher 
than 5 in the polity IV scale, and 0 otherwise.  
• Per capita GDP levels and GDP growth (from the Maddison database).  
• Annual population growth (WDI).  
• Changes in government expenditures on health (IMF) 
• Changes in government expenditures on education (IMF) 
• Changes in social protection expenditure as share of GDP (IMF).  
Regressions are run on a dataset for the years 1990-2008. The results of the regressions for 
child mortality show that democracy and higher expenditures on education are the most 
robust determinants of yearly reductions in child mortality. In the most complete 
specification, which includes all the variables above, as well as lagged values for changes in 
expenditures and GDP growth, the indicator for bureaucratic autonomy has a significant 
effect. Most of the other indicators have non-significant coefficients. With regard to changes 
in TBC incidence, the authors again find significant effects of bureaucratic autonomy and 
education expenditures.  
The authors stress that these results are preliminary ones and that further research is needed. 
Better and more comprehensive measures of bureaucratic autonomy and more tailored 
measures of state capacity need to be developed. But in spite of these limitations, the authors 
conclude that the results show a preliminary pattern pointing to the importance of institutions 
like democracy and bureaucratic autonomy for short-term improvements in basic welfare 
standards. 
 
6 Does growth contribute to poverty reduction? Do institutions 
and inequality matter? 
 
The paper on poverty reduction – The Pace of Poverty Reduction: A fractional response 
approach – by Richard Bluhm, Denis de Crombrugghe and Adam Szirmai revisits one of the 
central questions of economic development, namely the relative contributions of economic 
growth and changes in income inequality to poverty reduction.  
The role of institutions in the analysis shifted in important ways as the research for this paper 
evolved. Initially, one of the aims of the paper was to examine how institutional 
characteristics could affect the ways in which poverty (measured by the poverty headcount 
ratio, the percentage of the population below a given poverty line) responded to changes in 
income inequality and changes in income per capita (economic growth). The authors assumed 
that certain institutional characteristics – e.g. the pattern of land ownership, or institutions 
governing access to productive assets – would influence the poverty elasticities of growth and 
inequality. As the project progressed it became clear that if the decomposition equation was 
correctly specified, changes in poverty could be completely attributed to changes in income 
per capita and changes in income inequality. There was no place for institutions at this level 
of the analysis.  
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This does not mean, however, that institutional characteristics are unimportant for poverty 
reduction. First of all, one could argue that the degree of inequality itself is an important 
proxy of institutional characteristics. Thus in publications of Acemoglu and his co-authors 
(e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) inclusive institutions are contrasted with extractive 
institutions. In the tradition of North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) open access to economic 
and political organisations is contrasted with limited access. In the work of Engerman and 
Sokoloff (2002) institutions create and maintain more or less equal distributions of wealth, 
human capital and access to economic and political opportunities (for a review see Bluhm 
and Szirmai 2012). It is clear that institutional characteristics such as inclusiveness and open 
access are closely related to income inequality and the nature of the income distribution. 
Next, if one makes an analytical distinction between income inequality and underlying 
institutions, institutional characteristics enter the quantitative analysis as important 
determinants of changes in inequality as well as rates of economic growth. With regard to 
economic growth, evidence of the importance of institutions has been presented in several of 
the papers of this project. For instance in the two papers by Bluhm, de Crombrugghe and 
Szirmai (2012, 2013a) the authors have shown that institutional characteristics can help 
explain the occurrence of economic crises and the duration of slumps. Bhupatiraju and 
Verspagen (2013) have shown that institutions are a determinant of economic performance. 
Thus we may conclude that institutional characteristics are important ultimate determinants, 
of poverty and poverty reduction but that they operate indirectly via growth and changes in 
inequality, rather than directly. 
The contributions of the paper are threefold: First, it makes the important methodological 
point that poverty decompositions should take the bounded nature of the most important 
poverty indicator, the poverty headcount ratio, into account. Second, using a new – so-called 
fractional response approach – the paper provides estimates of the income and inequality 
elasticities of poverty for both the two dollar a day and the one dollar a day poverty lines. 
Third, on this basis of this improved methodology, the paper presents poverty projections 
from 2010 until 2030. 
Methodological contributions 
In the empirical analysis of poverty changes, the most frequently used measure is the poverty 
headcount ratio – the fraction of the total population below a given poverty line. The 
headcount ratio is bounded; it varies only between zero and one. However, linear estimations 
of poverty changes do not account for this boundedness, resulting in poorly fitting 
approximations of the underlying decomposition identity. In addition, the relationship 
between income and poverty, or inequality and poverty, is known to be highly non-linear. 
Poverty elasticities are not constant but vary substantially with the initial levels of inequality 
and income per capita.  
The paper applies fractional response models (see Papke and Wooldridge 1996, 2008; 
Wooldridge 2010) to poverty reduction. It presents extensions of such models dealing with 
unobserved heterogeneity, measurement error and the unbalanced character of the panel data. 
The result is a greatly improved accuracy of the poverty decomposition that fully captures the 
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non-linearity of the poverty-inequality-growth nexus (for technical details the reader is 
referred to the original paper). 
A second important contribution is the paper’s emphasis on semi-elasticities as the most 
policy-relevant quantity for assessing the poverty reduction potential of particular country (or 
region). In the case of elasticities, relative differences in the headcount ratio are related to 
relative differences in incomes and relative changes in inequality. This can be extremely 
misleading. In richer countries with very low levels of absolute poverty, small absolute 
changes in the poverty headcount will result in very large relative reductions of poverty. 
Elasticities will thus (automatically) give the impression that richer countries are better at 
poverty reduction. It is more revealing to use semi-elasticities, where the key concept is the 
percentage point change in the poverty headcount (e.g. a headcount of 10% in 2010 compared 
to a headcount of 5% in 2009 is a 5 percentage point decrease). Semi-elasticities approach 
zero as countries become richer. While this paper is not the first to point to the importance of 
semi-elasticities (see e.g. Klasen and Misselhorn, 2008), estimating semi-elasticities with 
fractional response models provides new insights into global poverty dynamics. 
A third methodological contribution is that this paper addresses important limitations of 
international poverty statistics. It corrects the estimated elasticities and semi-elasticities for 
time-persistent measurement differences between different types of surveys and time-varying 
measurement errors in income. Not accounting for measurement errors in average incomes 
would lead downward biased estimates of the income (semi-)elasticity of poverty. In 
addition, the paper accounts for the irregular spacing of poverty data due to the limited 
availability of household surveys in developing countries.   
Data 
The dataset for this paper derives from the World Bank PovcalNet database, which provides a 
set of 809 national representative surveys of income or consumption covering 124 countries 
from 1981 to 2010. 
The paper tackles two important data problems. First, the dataset is a mix of household 
surveys of income and household surveys of consumption expenditures. For linear models, 
log differences are observations that are based on differences between two compatible types 
of surveys for the same country, which are subsequently converted to an annual basis. This 
results in a smaller dataset of 648 observations in 104 countries, as differencing requires the 
combination of original data points. In the fractional response models, the authors simply add 
dummy variables indicating the type of survey (income versus consumption, grouped or 
household-level data), which proxies for structural differences among surveys. In addition, 
some countries only report separate urban and rural household surveys. The authors weight 
the poverty and income data using urban/rural population shares to construct nationally 
representative series (a special adjustment is used for the Gini coefficient, see the paper). 
In some regressions per capita consumption data from the national accounts are used as 
instrumental variables for average income to account for time-varying measurement errors in 
income obtained from the household surveys. 
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Findings 
As such the findings with regard to average elasticities are consistent with those in the 
previous literature (e.g. Adams, 2004; Bourguignon, 2003; Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007; 
Klasen and Misselhorn, 2008) – though somewhat at the lower end –, but the fit of the 
models is much better.  In terms of a simple R-squared measure, the correlation between 
observed and fitted values is near perfect (>.99). In the preferred specification of the authors, 
a one percent increase in per capita income (holding inequality constant) on average results in 
a 0.339 percentage point reduction of poverty (at the 2$ a day poverty line). A one percent 
decline in the Gini coefficient of income inequality results in a 0.251 percentage point 
reduction in poverty (see Bluhm et al. 2013, table 2, specification 3). 
One of the strengths of the fractional response approach lies in its ability to deliver more 
precise estimates of elasticities other than the overall average. Tables 3 and 4 provide 
regional elasticities. As elasticities depend on initial levels of income and inequality, the 
regional differences are themselves mainly due to differences in income levels and 
differences in initial degrees of inequality. Table 3 shows the estimated regional income 
elasticities, table 4 the regional inequality elasticities. 
 
Table 3 Predicted regional income elasticities, preferred specification, 2$ a day 
 1981-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-10 
East Asia and the Pacific -0.991 -1.029 -1.237 -1.139 -1.578 
 
(-0.03) (-0.033) (-0.0550) (-0.043) (-0.101) 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia -4.358 -2.892 -2.700 -2.846 -3.304 
 
(-0.555) (-0.309) (-0.277) (-0.304) (-0.384) 
Latin American and Caribbean -2.284 -2.374 -2.425 -2.349 -2.985 
 
(-0.243) (-0.257) (-0.271) (-0.258) (-0.366) 
Middle East and North Africa -2.176 -2.116 -2.024 -1.966 -2.501 
 
(-0.203) (-0.188) (-0.168) (-0.161) (-0.246) 
South Asia -0.548 -0.629 -0.81 -1.024 -1.192 
 
(-0.053) (-0.048) (-0.03) (-0.032) (-0.046) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.831 -0.437 -0.436 -0.592 -0.632 
 
(-0.027) (-0.039) (-0.04) (-0.035) (-0.033) 
 
More affluent regions (Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and the Middle East and North Africa) have higher income elasticities than poorer regions 
(East Asia and Pacific, South Asia and Sub- Saharan Africa). Income dynamics over time are 
also clearly visible. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, for example, income is 
comparatively high before the post-communist transition, sharply collapses throughout the 
1990s and then recovers during the 2000s. 
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Table 4: Predicted regional Gini elasticities, preferred specification, 2$ a day 
 1981-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-10 
East Asia and the Pacific 0.732 0.76 0.914 0.841 1.165 
 
(-0.105) (-0.101) (-0.113) (-0.108) (-0.144) 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 3.219 2.136 1.994 2.102 2.44 
 
(-0.51) (-0.307) (-0.283) (-0.296) (-0.353) 
Latin American and Caribbean 1.687 1.753 1.791 1.735 2.205 
 
(-0.186) (-0.198) (-0.199) (-0.189) (-0.269) 
Middle East and North Africa 1.607 1.563 1.495 1.452 1.847 
 
(-0.197) (-0.198) (-0.196) (-0.185) (-0.253) 
South Asia 0.405 0.464 0.598 0.756 0.88 
 
(-0.093) (-0.097) (-0.095) (-0.107) (-0.127) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.614 0.322 0.322 0.437 0.467 
 
(-0.087) (-0.055) (-0.06) (-0.066) (-0.069) 
 
The region- and time-specific Gini elasticities in Table 4 show where the potential for 
proportionate reductions in the poverty headcount through redistributive policies was greatest 
over the last three decades. Unsurprisingly, these regions were Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa (all of which 
have above average inequality). Sub-Saharan Africa started out with high inequality in the 
1980s but incomes were very low relative to the poverty line, so that the Gini elasticity was 
small.  
Double dividend 
Combining semi-elasticities of Gini and income in a single graph illustrates the large double 
poverty dividend that can be reaped through combined growth and redistribution. In short, the 
more equal a society, the greater the potential for poverty reduction through growth. 
Figure 7 shows the predicted response of poverty to shifts in income and inequality (Gini). 
On the horizontal axis one finds average income as a fraction of the poverty line   ⁄ . In 
the upper panel, the vertical axis shows the estimated elasticities (the relative response of 
poverty to changes in income or inequality), in the lower panel it shows semi-elasticities. For 
the reader it is important to note that an elasticity of zero implies no reduction in poverty and 
large negative values denote strong reductions in poverty. The Gini elasticities are positive as 
they measure the response of poverty to increasing inequality.  
The pictures are very intuitive. The top
is systematically higher, if the initial level of inequality is lower. Countries profit more from 
growth if they start with more equal distributions. The top
elasticity of inequality is also affected by higher initial e
The bottom panel plots the predicted semi
(with average income     far below the poverty line 
far below the poverty line. As a result, both the income and the Gini semi
approach zero. In a very poor country, it is difficult to lift people above the poverty line.
However, if the country is very r
poverty line. In this case both semi
most people above the poverty line, further increases in income or declines in poverty will 
not make much of a difference. 
Between those two extremes, improvements in the income distribution can make a very large 
difference in terms of percent of the population lifted out of poverty, both, directly through 
redistribution and indirectly through growth. If ave
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   1⁄ , for example, a Gini of 0.25 implies that one percent income growth leads to a 
0.584 percentage point reduction in the poverty headcount 
entire population are lifted out of
income growth leads to a 0.378 percentage point reduction in the poverty headcount. 
Especially at low average income levels the initial income distribution is decisive. It 
practically determines whether there is any substantial potential for poverty alleviation 
through income growth at all (in terms of percent of the population that is poor). Moreover, 
as the Gini semi-elasticity also depends on the level of inequality, further improvements in 
the income distribution will have a larger effect on poverty reduction at lower levels of 
inequality. This suggests that poverty reduction strategies should focus both on income 
growth and equalisation, especially in least developed countries and high inequ
where the total returns to redistribution are large. 
 
Projecting poverty  
The model developed in this paper can be used to project poverty rates in to the future (after 
making assumptions about rates of growth and changes in inequality). T
the potential for such projections till 2030 using two very simple assumptions, namely that a 
country’s future growth rate of per capita consumption will be equal to the average growth 
rate between 1995 and 2010, and that there will be
inequality. The projections are made for the two dollar a day poverty line.  Even this very 
simple extrapolation provides us with some very interesting insights.
Figure 8
   Source: Bluhm et al. 2013 
Given past growth trajectories, poverty in Sub
fundamental development challenge of the twenty first century. At the 2$a day line, estimated 
poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa is very high in 2010 (69.02%) and projecte
through 2030 (54.02%) on the entire subcontinent in spite of sustained income growth (about 
2.3% p.a.). In South Asia poverty is equally high in 2010 (68.36%), but projected to fall by 
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more than half (to 26.06% in 2030). By 2030, about half of the world's poor will live in Sub-
Saharan Africa, followed closely by South Asia. Poverty in the East Asia and Pacific region, 
on the contrary, largely takes care of itself if incomes and consumption expenditures keep 
growing at the impressive rates of the last 15 years.  
Poverty in East Asia (4.86%) is projected to be less than in Latin America (5.52%) by 2030, 
and second only to Eastern Europe and Central Asia where absolute poverty virtually 
disappears (down to 0.46%). Most of the progress in East Asia is due to rapid income and 
expenditure growth in China. Progress in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle 
East and North Africa is noticeably slower in spite of the assumption of robust yet moderate 
income growth and comparatively large income elasticities. Progress in Latin American and 
the Middle East North Africa is slower. 
It is clear that these projections depend on the assumptions concerning growth and inequality. 
It would be possible to develop a whole range of scenarios, but that is a topic for subsequent 
research.  
 
Concluding remarks  
The focus of the paper is on estimating the income and inequality (semi-)elasticities of 
poverty. But the elasticities can also be combined with actual changes in income and 
inequality to get the contribution of income growth or inequality to overall poverty reduction 
(i.e. how much of a given change in poverty is due to economic growth and how much is due 
to changes in inequality). 
The panel dataset  used in the paper indicates that while there is substantial variation in 
inequality, it shows no systematic average trend over the period from 1981 to 2010.6 In 
contrast, incomes and expenditures have increased substantially in all regions over the same 
time span. At first sight, one might therefore be tempted to conclude that it is growth that 
drives most of poverty reduction (c.f. Dollar and Kraaij, 2002, 2004), but this conclusion is 
not warranted for two reasons. First, decompositions should not be done on basis of the 
average changes, but on changes in specific countries. There will be countries which combine 
growth with declining inequality, growth with increasing inequality, stagnation with 
increasing inequality and so forth. This is another exciting avenue for further research.  
A second important insight is that the (semi-)elasticities of growth and inequality depend 
very much on the initial levels of inequality and per capita income. Thus, in a country with a 
more equal initial distribution of income, a given increase in per capita reduction will result 
in much more poverty reduction than in a country with an unequal distribution of income. 
Also, the potential for poverty reduction depends very much on the average level of income. 
If the level of income is such that many people are bunched close to a poverty line, the 
                                               
6 In some countries there are increases in inequality, in others declines or no changes. In the dataset, there is 
hardly any relationship between growth rates and changes in the Gini coefficient (see Bluhm et al. 2013, figure 
B-4). This runs counter to the widespread assumption that rapid growth is associated with rapid increases in 
inequality. This is clearly one of the avenues for further investigation.  
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poverty elasticities will be much greater than if large numbers of the population are far below 
or far above the poverty line. 
The analysis of the pace of poverty reduction provides a reaffirmation of an old insight from 
the growth with redistribution literature in the 1970s (Chenery et al. 1974), namely that there 
is a very large double dividend for developing countries that succeed in combining rapid 
growth with redistribution. Hence, the paper concludes as follows (Bluhm et al. 2013, p. 24): 
“It is tempting to interpret our findings as evidence of the primacy of growth. Yet, we are by 
no means arguing that income growth is all that matters for poverty reduction. It is important 
to emphasise that the causal effect of any particular policy on aggregate household income 
and the relative distribution of income cannot be discerned from a decomposition exercise 
such as this. What it does is help to identify how a given change in average income or in 
distribution translates into poverty outcomes, and not how that change is brought about. 
Hence, the importance of institutions, trade and a host of other factors for poverty alleviation 
remains undiminished. There is a potentially large ‘double dividend’ to be reaped if growth 
can be achieved in combination with simultaneous reductions in inequality.” 
 
7 Some reflections on further research 
This paper provides a rough summary and synthesis of the papers of the second phase of the 
AFD/ MGSoG research project on institutions and long run economic performance. In this 
concluding paragraph, we provide some reflections concerning possible avenues for future 
research, both substantive and with regard to the future of the IPD database. These should not 
be seen as ‘recommendations’ but rather as food for thought and debate.  
7.1 Creating panel datasets of institutional indicators 
Good time series for institutional indicators are still scarce. One of the priorities for the 
Institutional Profile Database is to create a usable panel version of the dataset, with questions 
that are repeated in successive waves. As the questions of the questionnaire and the coding 
categories have changed over time since 2001 this is a far from easy task. Some attempts 
have already been made to create panel versions of the dataset (e.g. Cingolani and de 
Crombrugghe 2012) but further attempts in this direction using a limited subset of questions 
common to several waves of the survey would be welcome.  
7.2 Comparisons of countries in time and space 
The usefulness of the IPD database will be enhanced if the presentation of the data allows for 
easy comparisons between countries in time and space for selected indicators. This is one of 
the strong points of datasets such as the World Governance Indicators and the Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessments. 
7.3 Exploiting the richness of the IPD data 
On the one hand IPD data need to be presented in a standardised format, which is accessible 
to both researchers and policy makers. This inevitably involves data reduction and 
aggregation. However one of the characteristics of IPD is the richness of the underlying 
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database, which is available online to be exploited by researchers. Using selected items from 
the questionnaire, researchers could develop clear conceptual indicators for selected aspects 
of the institutional structure, such as state capacity, land ownership, family institutions, 
educational institutions and so forth. The seventeen papers written in the context of this 
project provide pointers for such work.  
One of the problems of the present database is that so many of the items turn out to be highly 
correlated with one or two basic dimensions if one applies factor analytic techniques. Perhaps 
the use of carefully selected small subsets of the data focusing on specific well-defined 
concepts provides one possible way forward. 
7.4 Analytic country studies and cross-country quantitative analysis 
There is scope for fruitful combinations of analytic country studies and cross-country 
quantitative analysis. Country studies can provide a rich and context specific analysis of 
institutions and institutional change, which tends to get lost in the comparative statistical 
analysis. Cross country statistical studies develop hypotheses and theories which can be 
examined in a country study context. The statistical analysis also serves as a check on single 
country studies.  
7.5 Dynamic analysis of institutions and institutional change 
There is a need for more dynamic analysis of institutions. A large part of the quantitative 
literature focuses on institutions in a rather static sense. Questions that are asked include 
whether institutions are more important than geography or openness, or whether 
expropriation risk does or does not explain investment and growth. It is an illusion to think 
that such questions can be answered irrespective of time and place. For instance, the role of 
geography was obviously more important in pre-modern times, when transport costs where 
overwhelmingly important and communication possibilities were limited (e.g. Williamson, 
2011). Instead of taking institutions as static and unchanging variables which compete with 
other ultimate factors in explaining development, one should interpret institutions as evolving 
and co-evolving together with other dimensions of economy and society. This would help us 
to develop theories of institutional change and hopefully also theories about the kind of 
national or international policy interventions that generate successful processes of change and 
reform. 
The current financial crisis in the advanced economies highlights the need for a dynamic 
analysis of institutions. In the past variables such as financial depth, financial intermediation, 
financial openness, stock markets and financial innovation were seen as key elements 
contributing to economic growth and development. Emerging economies were urged to 
emulate the financial institutions of the advanced economies. Now it seems that the financial 
institutions that have developed in the advanced economies have become dysfunctional and 
destructive, causing crisis in the advanced economies and posing huge risks to the world 
economy. Thus dynamic institutional analysis has to take into account that institutions change 
over time and that the same kind of institutions may function differently as conditions 
change. It is this kind of changes which are hard to capture in econometric analysis with 
static institutional indicators. Institutions which may have been contributors to growth in the 
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past may become obstacles at later stages of development. An indication of the dynamic 
relationships between institutions and economic shocks is provided in the paper of Bluhm et 
al. 2013 on economic slumps. These authors argue that slumps may offer windows of 
opportunity for institutional improvements. 
7.6 Spatial dimensions 
The papers by Bhupatiraju and Verspagen have highlighted the importance of spatial 
dimensions of institutions as a fruitful area for further research. Countries do not exist in 
isolation but are also influenced by the institutional characteristics of neighbouring countries 
and regions.  
7.7 Proximate factors: investment, savings, innovation, education 
The papers by Farla and al. have shown how institutions can influence important proximate 
sources of growth such as investment, the relationships between FDI and domestic 
investment and intermediate factors such as industrial policy. But the results are still 
preliminary and often somewhat inconclusive. More needs to be done to derive policy 
relevant conclusions about how the volume of investment can be increased and the 
contributions of FDI optimised through an appropriate mix of policies and institutional 
reforms. Unscrambling the interactions between institutional reform and investment 
behaviour is a challenging and interesting avenue for future research. A better understanding 
of how institutional and policy reforms influence rent seeking behaviours of different types of 
investors is of considerable policy relevance. 
Next, similar research projects can be developed concerning the influence of institutional 
characteristics on other proximate sources of economic growth such as savings rates, 
innovative performance or investment in human capital. 
7.8 Growth episodes 
The study of different types of growth episodes turns out to be a very fruitful avenue for 
research, which clearly highlights the importance of institutional factors. The kind of analysis 
applied to the onset of crises and the duration of declines in the papers of this project could be 
applied to many different types of growth episodes. An exciting challenge is to show how 
successive growth episodes and their characteristics add up to longer patterns of growth, 
catch up, stagnation or falling behind. Once we start to understand the nature of growth 
episodes and the factors explaining them, we may be better placed to tackle long-run 
differences in growth performance.   
7.9 State capacities 
The two papers on state capacities have illustrated the importance of state capacity and have 
indicated that this is an exciting area for further research. In particular, it could be a challenge 
to define and operationalise the characteristics of developmental states that can play a role in 
accelerated growth and catch up. For this we need to develop better and more precise 
measures of concepts such as bureaucratic autonomy, the meritocratic nature of the 
bureaucracy, implementation capacity and limits to the power of the executive. Another topic 
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that merits further research is that of capacity building. Can empirical research provide us 
with lessons and guidelines for improving different state capacities? 
7.10 Growth, inequality and poverty reduction 
Further analysis of the role of growth and changes in inequality in poverty reduction is 
another promising avenue for further research. By now we can be fairly confident about the 
coefficients which measure the poverty elasticity of growth and inequality. This would allow 
us to develop a wide range of scenarios with different combinations of growth and inequality. 
This is one of the interesting avenues for future research. 
Next, more can be done in modeling the interactions between growth and inequality in the 
real world. To what extent are growth accelerations in catch-up economies accompanied by 
increasing income disparities? To what extent do excessive redistributive policies at early 
stages of development dampen the speed of growth? Can we identify developmental paths 
with feasible combinations of accelerated growth and declining inequality? 
Further examination of the country specific paths with regard to inequality and growth will 
allow us to give quite specific decompositions of how much of poverty reduction is driven by 
growth and how much by spontaneous and/or policy driven changes in income inequality.  
Finally, we have concluded from the research in this project that institutions do not affect the 
elasticity of poverty reduction directly. Changes in poverty can be accounted for by the two 
key variables, growth and inequality. But, what the research in this project has clearly shown 
is that growth itself is influenced by institutional characteristics and that the degree of income 
inequality reflects deeper levels of institutionalised inequality in societies. Thus in future 
research, we could develop more comprehensive models taking growth and inequality as the 
proximate determinants of poverty reduction and adding policies, institutions, geography and 
other intermediate and ultimate factors that affect growth and inequality into the analysis.  
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